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PARTIAL BIRTH BIOPOLITICS*
Joshua E. Perry, JD., M T.S.
INTRODUCTION
On April 18, 2007, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision
in Gonzales v. Carhart.l The dispute before the Court was triggered by
LeRoy Carhart, William G. Fitzhugh, William H. Knorr, and Jill L.
Vibhakar, doctors whose practices include second-trimester abortions.2
These physicians sought a permanent injunction against enforcement of
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (Act) and argued that the
Act was unconstitutional because, inter alia, it lacked an exception
allowing the procedure when necessary to protect the health of the
mother. In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act, holding that the Act's
failure to include a health exception does not impose an undue burden
on a woman's right to abortion.
The Court's decision in Carhart opens new doors for future
politicized governmental interference in the lives of patients and their
doctors. Regulation of physician practices that protects public health
and safety is a legitimate and worthwhile legislative pursuit. The
* Josh Perry is based in the Center for Biomedical Ethics and Society at Vanderbilt
University where he is Assistant Professor in the School of Medicine and Adjunct
Professor in the Law School. Professor Perry is grateful to Jeff Bishop, Rebecca
Brown, Larry Churchill, Ellen Clayton, and Marshall Kapp for helpful and generous
comments on preliminary drafts.
'127 S.Ct. 1610 (2007).2 Id. at 1611.
3 The physicians also made two other arguments. First, they argued that the Act is
facially void because its language describing specific procedures and physician intent
was unconstitutionally vague. The Court dismissed this argument, citing Posters 'N'
Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1994) (stating "[The Act] sets
forth 'relatively clear guidelines as to prohibited conduct' and provides 'objective
criteria' to evaluate whether a doctor has performed a prohibited procedure.") Id. at
1628. Second, they argued that the Act imposes an undue burden, as a facial matter,
because, according to the physicians, the Act's text proscribes all dilation and
extraction abortion procedures, which constitute the most common second-trimester
abortion method. The Court rejected this contention and pointed to language in the
Act distinguishing the prohibited form of intact dilation and evacuation (D&E)
involving a still-living, intact fetus, from standard D&E procedures involving
removal of the fetus in pieces, which according to the Court's interpretation is
excluded from the Act. Id. at 1630-32 (emphasis added).
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Court's decision in Carhart, however, is troubling because the Act
regulates medical practices on the basis of legislative repugnance
regarding procedural details of a specific and complicated abortion
method. Moreover, the Court's Carhart decision fails to distinguish
between appropriate governmental regulation premised on a public
safety concern and legislative intervention motivated by moral outrage
that threatens a recognized liberty interest of individual citizens. Those
concerned with biopolitics-the use of governmental power to regulate
and control the personal and private space of one's health care
decisions-have new reasons to be worried about the future of
reproductive freedoms and the exercise of clinical medical judgment.5
I. PARTIAL BIRTH ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE
After the Act was signed by President Bush, its enforcement
was immediately enjoined, and challenges to the ban's constitutionality
began the long and winding road leading to the Supreme Court. Initial
reviews by six different District and Circuit courts found the Act
unconstitutional, based primarily on Congress's failure to include an
exception for the mother's health. These lower courts were following
and applying the precedents of Planned Parenthood v. Casey and
Stenberg v. Carhart.
In Stenberg-the first "partial birth abortion case"-the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Nebraska law
banning the intact dilation and evacuation (D&E) abortion procedure.
Despite the plain language in Casey requiring all abortion regulations
to include an exception for procedures "'necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother,"' Nebraska legislators had failed to include any such health
4 Arguably, the Act does not have the effect of actually curtailing the number of
abortions. Rather, the Act is aimed at one particular abortion procedure referred to as
intact dilation and evacuation (D&E) (or "dilation and extraction" (D&X) or "intact
D&X"), a variation on standard D&E. According to the Court, the main difference
between the two procedures is that in intact D&E proscribed by the Act, "a doctor
extracts the [living] fetus intact or largely intact," instead of pulling it apart and
extracting body parts during 10 to 15 passes through the uterus. Id. at 1616. The
Court clarifies in its conclusion that "an injection that kills the fetus is a [legal]
alternative under the Act that allows the doctor to perform the [intact D&E]
procedure." Id. at 1638.
5 Jeffrey P. Bishop & Fabrice Jotterand, Bioethics as Biopolitics, 31 J. MED. & PHIL.,
205-12 (2006).
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exception. 6 Following the Casey precedent, the Stenberg Court struck
down Nebraska's prohibition on the grounds that it imposed an
unconstitutional "undue burden" because substantial medical authority
supported the proposition that banning the intact D&E (a.k.a. "partial
birth") procedure could endanger the health of some women.7 Writing
for Stenberg's 5-4 majority, Justice Stephen Breyer noted that, "where
substantial medical authority supports the proposition that banning a
particular abortion procedure could endanger women's health,
[Supreme Court precedent] requires the statute to include a health
exception."
8
Six years later, medical authorities such as the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists still considered the intact
D&E procedure medically necessary in certain cases.9  The 5-4
majority in Carhart, however, reached a different constitutional
conclusion than the Stenberg Court on the question of whether a
nationwide ban on this procedure-without an exception for the health
of the mother-would constitute an undue burden to some women
seeking an abortion after the first trimester.
Relatively early in the legal analysis portion of the majority
opinion, Justice Kennedy notes past Court precedents requiring
governmental regulatory schemes to maintain the delicate balance
between protecting the life of the fetus that may become a child and the
health of the woman.' 0 Later in his opinion, however, when he
addresses the merits of the case, his analysis fails to include discussion
of the State's interest in protecting the health of the woman. Rather, he
places sole emphasis on protection of the life of the fetus and neglects
the balancing that he addressed earlier in the opinion. 1
Kennedy argues that if the governmental regulation does not
impose an "undue burden, the State may [in regulating the medical
profession] use its regulatory power ...to promote respect for life,
including life of the unborn."' 2 The majority's opinion concludes-in
contradiction to a "significant body of medical opinion [holding that
6 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U. S. 914, 938 (2000) (citing Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992)).
7id.
8Id.
9 ACOG News Release, ACOG Files Amicus Brief in Gonzales v. Carhart and
Gonzales v. PPFA (Sept. 22, 2006), available at http://www.acog.org/from home/
publications/press releases/nr09-22-06.cfm (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
'o See Carhart, 127 S.Ct. at 1626.
" Id. at 1633-36.
12Id. at 1633.
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intact dilation and evacuation] has some safety advantages ... for some
women in some circumstances"-that the Act does not impose an
undue burden. 13 As noted by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent, this
conclusion is perplexing given the fact that seven years earlier in
Stenberg-a case presenting materially identical circumstances-the
Court found the absence of a health exception to be an unconstitutional
undue burden upon all women for whom it is relevant, "women who, in
the judgment of their doctors, require an intact D&E because other
procedures would place their health at risk."' 14
Although Kennedy writes that "[u]ncritical deference to
Congress' factual findings" is "inappropriate," he rejects an
interpretation of Stenberg that would require a health exception if
substantial medical authority concluded that legislative regulation
might endanger a woman's health. 15 Kennedy's reading of Stenberg
creates an uneasy tension between politicians and doctors when he
argues that "considerations of marginal safety, including the balance of
risks, are within the legislative competence."'16  As interpreted by
dissenting Justice Ginsburg, this analysis fails to take seriously the
necessity of exceptions safeguarding a woman's health as articulated in
Casey and Stenberg. 17
Finally, the Court's failure to maintain an appropriate emphasis
on protecting women's health is made more troubling by the rationale
offered to bolster its argument. In support of his position, Justice
Kennedy suggests that some women are unlikely to understand the
medical procedure to which they are consenting because of failure on
the part of physicians to disclose details of the intact D&E procedure in
clear and precise terms. 18  However, instead of mandating a
requirement that physicians fully inform their patients of the specific
abortion procedure, and of its potential physical and emotional risks,
"the Court [instead] deprives women of the right to make an
autonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety." 19 Kennedy's
opinion assumes that doctors who perform intact D&E procedures will
not honor their obligation to inform fully their patients or that the
13 Id. at 1636.
14 Id. at 1651 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
15 Carhart, 127 S.Ct., at 1636.
16 Id. at 1636-37 (emphasis added).
17 Id. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
18 Id. at 1634.
19 Id. at 1640-42 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
PARTIAL BIRTH BIOPOLITICS
women lack the capacity to make a "free" choice that is in their best
interest. These assumptions highlight a troubling emotionalism in
Kennedy's appeal precisely where one would hope to find a solid
grounding in precedent and protection of the affected persons'
individual liberty interests. Perhaps even more problematic, Justice
Kennedy's rationale signals a biopolitical power shift in decision-
making away from a woman and her physician and, in combination
with his deference to "legislative competence," an alarming willingness
by the third branch of government to defer to biopolitical regulation of
women's bodies by legislative bodies.
II. FOUCAULT, BIOPOWER, AND THE RISE OF
BIOPOLITICS °
Beginning with lectures in the mid- 1970s and continuing in The
History of Sexuality, Michel Foucault developed the concept of
biopower- a theory that sought to explain a state's political power over
"life and its mechanisms" and critique those ways in which the state's
regulatory power became "an agent of the transformation of human
life" used to control the bodies of the body politic. 2 1 For Foucault,
individual rights to life, death, health, sex-"to rediscover what one is
and all that one can be"-were all threatened by the twentieth century
rise of regimes intent on a calculated exercise of biopower to "make
live and let die."22  Further developing Foucault's thesis, Italian
political philosopher Giorgio Agamben notes that as these individual
rights became more politicized, so too did the power of the state
increase:
20 For a more detailed discussion of Foucault and application of his biopower and
biopolitics critical theories across other domains, see Joshua E. Perry, Biopolitics at
the Bedside: Proxy Wars and Feeding Tubes, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 171, 174-182 (June
2007).
21 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME 1: AN INTRODUCTION
[hereinafter SEXUALITY] 143 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1978). For a
helpful discussion of biopower and biopolitics, see Paul Rabinow, Introduction to
THE FOUCAULT READER 3, 12-23 (Paul Rabinow ed., Pantheon Books, 1984).
22 See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED: LECTURES AT
THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE (1975-76) (David Macey trans., Picador New York, 2003)
[hereinafter LECTURES]. See also Joshua E. Perry, Biopolitics at the Bedside: Proxy
Wars and Feeding Tubes, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 171, 174 (June 2007) ("The rise of
contemporary Western society, therefore, was fueled by the development of this
biopower phenomenon; this is a phenomenon that Foucault describes as the rise of
state power over all "living things"--the power to regulate, discipline, and take
control of life and life processes.").
2008]
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It is almost as if, starting from a certain point, every
decisive political event were double sided: the spaces, the
liberties, and the rights won by individuals in their conflicts
with central powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit
but increasing inscription of individuals' lives within the
state order, thus offering a new and more dreadful
foundation for the very sovereign power from which they
wanted to liberate themselves.23
Thus, as Jeff Bishop observes, the state comes to wield both an
enabling and a repressive power over life.2 4  And, in the West -
particularly in the U.S. - this biopower quickly manifests as a
regulatory authority over the lives and bodies of individuals.
On Foucault's account, the era of biopower emerged as Western
states attempted to cope with booming urban populations by
formalizing state control over life and death.25 This state exercise of
discipline, control, and power over life and death came in the form of
anatomo-politics and biopolitics.2 6  Anatomo-politics refers to state
attempts to refine and standardize individuals via controls over the
human body as it is incorporated into and for the benefit of the
27
capitalistic state. Biopolitics refers to control over the whole
population, with the problems of urbanization creating state concern
over fertility, public health, and life expectancy.28 Foucault argued that
biopolitics ultimately problematizes the entire 2 opulation and,
inevitably, gives rise to the "power of regularization."
23 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 121 (Daniel
Heller-Roazen trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1998) (1995).
24 Jeffrey P. Bishop, Bioethics, Biopolitics, and the Sovereign Subject of Death
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
25 Perry, Biopolitics at the Bedside: Proxy Wars and Feeding Tubes, 28 J. LEGAL
MED. 171, 174 (June 2007).
26 FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY, supra note 21, at 139.
27 See generally Michel Foucault, The Political Technology of Individuals, in
TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF: A SEMINAR WITH MICHEL FOUCAULT 152 (Luther H.
Martin, et al. eds., Univ. of Mass. Press 1988) ([Gjovemment has to worry about
[individual citizens] only insofar as they are somehow relevant for the reinforcement
of the state's strength: what they do, their life, their death, their activity, their
individual behavior, their work, and so on ... [S]ometimes what [the citizen] has to
do for the state is to live, to work, to produce, to consume; and sometimes what he has
to do is to die.").
28 Perry, Biopolitics at the Bedside: Proxy Wars and Feeding Tubes, 28 J. LEGAL
MED. 171, 174-75 (June 2007) (citations omitted).
29 FOUCAULT, LECTURES, supra note 24, at 247.
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Ultimately, it is the use of this political power of regulation over
the body politic that is cause for some concern. Surely, some instances
of social benefit can be imagined. 30 However, as contemporary issues
of life and death trigger power dynamics between individuals, an
administratively-bureaucratized state, and a conservative ideological
movement which seeks to regulate the culture via legislation advancing
its version of the common good, perhaps it is inevitable that biopower
more often gives rise to a more objectionable brand of biopolitics.31
For instance, in the realm of reproductive rights one finds increasing
attempts by the state to control mechanisms relating to the biological
beginnings of life, even as individuals attempt to assert claims to
autonomy and rights to self-determination. It is to this particular
expression of biopolitics that our discussion now returns.
III. BIOPOLITICAL EXAMPLE PAR EXCELLENCE
Abortion is the biopolitical example par excellence-"a medical
procedure every aspect of which is heavily regulated. 32  Indeed, a
woman seeking to exercise her abortion rights must, in many states,
navigate through a regulatory labyrinth of consent procedures and
waiting periods, heretofore all allegedly premised on the State's interest
in protecting her health. Paradoxically, however, a woman desiring to
assert her legal right to control her body is not freed from the confines
of the regulatory state; she is only enmeshed in it all the more.33 As
Professor Parry notes, some regulation is presumably motivated by
concern for the woman's health and has nothing at all to do with
politics.34 Yet, the politicized nature of much of the regulation, i.e., the
required reading material discussing fetal development, is, for many, a
more problematic ideologically-driven expression of biopolitics. While
30 As I note in Biopolitics at the Bedside, Foucault suggests lowering the mortality
rate, raising life expectancy, and stimulating the birth rate as political biopower and
control that operates at a level of social generality and, arguably, beneficial social
utility.
31 I say much more about this conservative ideological movement, i.e., the Religious
Right, and the phenomena of Biblical BioPolitics in Joshua E. Perry, Biblical
BioPolitics: Judicial Process, Religious Rhetoric, Terri Schiavo and Beyond, 16
HEALTH MATRIX 553-650 (2006) [hereinafter Biblical BioPolitics].
32 John T. Parry, "Society Must Be [Regulated] ": Biopolitics and the Commerce
Clause in Gonzalez v. Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 853, 872 (2005) [hereinafter
Society Must be Regulated].
33 id.
34 Id. at 871-72.
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many might argue that even these obstacles are unduly burdensome, at
least these regulations are each accompanied with health exception
clauses that void the restriction if, in a particular case, it threatens to
compromise the woman's health.
As evident from the congressional record detailing the
motivations underlying passage of the Act at issue in Carhart,
regulation of reproductive freedoms features heavily-politicized
rhetoric and ideologically-inspired expressions of biopolitics.3
5
Disturbingly, however, as noted by Justice Ginsburg's dissent, much of
this same politicized ideology, in addition to Kennedy's paternalistic
comments regarding women's decision-making capabilities, creeps into
the Court's rhetoric. For instance, Kennedy repeatedly uses the
deprecatory label "abortion doctor" to refer to the obstetricians-
gynecologists and surgeons who provide women with these medical
services, and even, at an early point in his opinion, refers to the fetus as
an "unborn child."36 As noted by Professor George Annas, it is this
combination of "infantilizing pregnant women as incapable of making
serious decisions about their lives and health" and "categorizing
physicians as unprincipled 'abortion doctors' that propels the Court's
departure from settled precedent regarding the necessity of a health
care exception.37
Those who value constitutional principles of liberty, privacy,
and autonomy should fear governmental biopolitical regulation that
interferes with the medical judgment of a physician and threatens to
compromise the health of patients. Such fears are heightened by this
newly-configured Court and its apparent willingness to reinforce an
encroachment on individual liberty that is rooted in the "ethical and
moral concerns" of a congressional majority.38  The Court's
acknowledgment and approval of the role played by congressional
"moral concerns" signals an uneasy shift away from the previously
controlling precedent of Casey, in which the Court noted that its
"obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate [its] own moral
code." 3
9
35 For comparisons to similar expressions of political and ideological rhetoric in the
context of biopolitics, see generally Joshua E. Perry, Biblical Biopolitics, supra note
31.
36 Carhart, 127 S.Ct. at 1650 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
37 George J. Annas, The Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 356 N. ENGL. J. MED.,
(2007) 2201-07.
38 Carhart, 127 S.Ct. at 1633.
39 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1992).
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In general, over the last forty years, the Supreme Court has
increasingly taken a dim view of governmental regulations premised
primarily on a legislative majority's conception of morality. Instead,
the Court has closely guarded an individual's right to safety, health,
liberty, privacy and autonomy against moralistic legislative action. For
example, in 1965 the Court ruled unconstitutional a Connecticut statute
banning the distribution of contraceptives and their use by married
individuals. The Court's reasoning emphasized the limits of
governmental regulation in the arena of individual liberties.40  Seven
years later the Court considered a similar law in Massachusetts banning
the use of contraceptives by single individuals.4' In ruling the statute
unconstitutional, the Court noted its codification under the heading
"Crimes Against Chastity, Morality, Decency, and Good Order," and
its failure to include an exception for distribution of contraceptives
necessary for the protection of a patient's health. While regulation of
some medical matters may be necessary for the protection of public
health, governmental regulation of a patient's body and private life
premised on legislative notions of morality and decency has a long
history of judicial repudiation.
Biopolitics, therefore, is about the exercise of political power to
control persons' bodies (and their meanings) and governmental
strategies used to dictate and regulate the terms on which individuals
make choices regarding how they live their lives. Prior to the Court's
opinion in Carhart, the most recent biopolitical bonanza was the
legislative intervention in decisions regarding Terri Schiavo's end-of-
life trajectory. In that episode-in which we witnessed a literal body
become a political battleground-the judiciary demonstrated restraint
in its failure to acquiesce to the politicized regulations urged by state
and federal legislatures.4 2 Instead of "erring on the side of life"-as
urged by a host of politicians, courts at every level opted to err on the
side of liberty and self-determination as they protected Ms. Schiavo's
legal right not to receive a continuing course of medical intervention
that evidence demonstrated she did not desire and could not restore her
neural devastation.
43
40 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
42 Joshua E. Perry, Larry R. Churchill, & Howard S. Kirshner, The Terri Schiavo
Case: Legal, Ethical and Medical Perspectives, 143 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED.,
744-48 (2005).
43 In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, 2000 WL 34546715, at *6-7
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 2000); In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 180 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001); In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551, 555 (Fla. Dist.
2008]
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In Carhart, however, the regulation of a woman's body and her
medical treatment is endorsed in problematic terms. Of particular note
is the Court's departure from previous precedents requiring regulatory
exceptions to protect a woman's health and the Court's reference to a
disturbingly paternalistic rationale. Moreover, Kennedy's majority
opinion offers no reason why future Court decisions impacting
individual bodies might not also defer to the "ethical and moral"
judgment of any given legislative body, regardless of the impact on
individual health or liberties. 44 Ultimately, a governmental scheme that
abrogates the physician's arsenal of available medical procedures and
allows whoever holds a majority in Congress to supersede the medical
judgment of a physician regarding the health of her patient is a form of
biopolitical regulation one would expect the high court to curtail,
particularly in light of its most recent precedents on highly-charged
social issues.
The Court's majority opinion, however, is unequivocal in its
emphasis that "the State has a significant role to play in regulating the
medical profession. 4 5 Indeed, strong precedents exist suggesting the
government does have a legitimate regulatory role in some medical
contexts with direct bearing on the protection of public health and
safety, as well as the preservation of life, including, for example, the
issuance and revocation of medical licenses and banning of physician-
assisted suicide. 46 Yet, regulation of late-term abortion procedures as
outlined in the Act does not share a similar relationship to these
legitimate protections of public health because neither public health and
safety nor the preservation of life is ultimately driving this legislation.47
Ct. App. 2001); In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 800 So. 2d 640, 641-44 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001); In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GB-003, 2002 WL
31817960, at *5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 22, 2002); In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So.
2d 182, 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F.
Supp. 2d 1378, 1387 (M.D. Fla. 2005); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d
1223, 1226 (1 lth Cir. 2005), rev'g en banc denied, 403 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2005).
44 Of course this does not necessarily mean that Roe is in immediate danger of being
overturned. See supra Annas, supra note 37, at 2206 (stating "[a]lthough Justice
Alito has replaced Justice O'Connor and is likely to vote in the opposite direction on
Roe-related issues, Justice Kennedy is the new swing vote on the Court, and he insists
that he is upholding the principles of Roe v. Wade as reaffirmed in Casey.")
41 Carhart, 127 S.Ct. at 1633.
46 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122-23 (1889); Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 794-95 (1997).
47 Carhart, 127 S.Ct. at 1647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating "[t]he law saves not a
single fetus from destruction, for it targets only a method of performing abortion. ...
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Rather, as the Court admits, "moral concerns" are what animated the
48
regulations imposed by Congress. Such a rationale is not a
constitutionally legitimate basis for legislative interference with
physician practice and patient health.
As applied in this reproductive rights context and without
following the Casey Court's concern for balancing fetal life with the
health of the mother, Kennedy's majority opinion signals a judicial
tipping of the scales in favor of moralistic legislative action. State and
federal legislatures will now encounter lower hurdles the next time they
see fit to regulate the health of a woman carrying a fetus in the second
or third trimester and the medical appropriateness of her physician's
choice of procedures for terminating her pregnancy.
49
Our confidence in the Court's willingness to curb such
biopolitical machinations-particularly those instances when a
legislative majority seeks to impose its own moral judgments and usurp
medical judgments regarding what procedures are most appropriate for
safeguarding the health of individual patients-has been weakened by
this most recent ruling in the ongoing evolution of abortion
jurisprudence.
And surely the statute was not designed to protect the lives or health of pregnant
women").481Id. at 1633.
49 As painstakingly depicted in the Court's opinion, it is the framing of intact D&E as
a gruesome and brutal variation of infanticide that seems to be driving the legislative
agenda and, to a significant extent, the Court's analysis. Yet, the Court's implicit
equation of a fetus aborted in a late second trimester intact D&E with the killing of a
baby marks a conceptual move away from the abortion jurisprudence of Roe and
Casey.
"[Carhart] refuses to take Casey and Stenberg seriously... It blurs the line, firmly
drawn in Casey, between previability and postviability abortions. And, for the first
time since Roe, the Court blesses a prohibition with no exception safeguarding a
woman's health." Id. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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